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Abstract: The credibility of a central bank’s anti-inflation stance, a key determinant 
of its success, may reflect institutional structure or, more dynamically, the history of 
policy decisions.  The first years of the European Central Bank (ECB) provide a 
natural experiment for considering whether, and how, central bank credibility 
evolves. In this paper, we present a model demonstrating how the high-frequency 
response of asset prices to news reflects market perceptions of the anti-inflation 
stance of a central bank. Empirical tests of this model on high frequency data, 
regressing both the change in the slope of the German yield curve and the change in 
the euro/dollar exchange rate on the surprise component of price news, suggest 
significant instability in the market’s perception of the policy stance of the ECB 
during its first five years of operation. Estimated smoothed paths of the coefficients 
linking news to asset prices show that these coefficients change with policies 
undertaken by the ECB.  In contrast, there is no evidence of parameter instability for 
the response of the slope of the United States yield curve to price news during this 
period, suggesting no comparable evolution in the market perceptions of the 
commitment to inflation fighting by the Federal Reserve. 
 
 
Keywords: Central Banking, European Central Bank, Federal Reserve, inflation, 
exchange rate, credibility, yield curve 
 
 
JEL Classification: F3, E5, E6 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
! The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. We have benefited from 
comments from, Donald Andrews,  Menzie Chinn, Graham Elliott, Sylvester Eijffinger, Ulrich Müller, 
Zhongjun Qu, Richard Portes, John Rogers, Jim Stock, Cedric Tille and participants at the January 2005 
ASSA, March 2005 TAFI JIMF conference, and NBER IFM meeting Spring 2005. Address 
correspondences to Linda S. Goldberg, Federal Reserve Bank of NY, Research Department, 33 Liberty St, 
New York, N.Y. 10045. email: Linda.Goldberg@ny.frb.org, or Michael W. Klein, Fletcher School, Tufts 
University, Medford MA 02155. email michael.klein@tufts.edu.  The authors thank Dia Ganguly and 
Eleanor Dillon for excellent research assistance. Establishing Credibility, Goldberg and Klein 
  1
1.  Introduction 
 
  The credibility of the anti-inflation stance of a central bank plays a key role in 
determining whether the goal of low inflation is attained.  This point is, by now, a standard 
theoretical result.
1 It is also received wisdom among practitioners.  In a survey of the heads 
of 84 central banks, as well as 52 prominent academic monetary economists, Blinder (2000) 
finds that credibility is considered vitally important and “helps keep inflation low.”   
  This consensus on the importance of credibility naturally leads to the question of how 
it is achieved, and whether and how it evolves over time.  One view is that establishing an 
appropriate institutional structure is the key element in attaining credibility.  A second, more 
dynamic, view focuses on the role that actual policy conduct plays in building the reputation 
of a central bank. These two different views have distinct implications for the relative 
importance of the structure of a central bank as compared to its conduct for attaining and 
maintaining its credibility. 
  A majority of respondents to Blinder’s survey believe that central bank credibility is 
based more its history of actions than on the construction of institutional structures that 
insulate a central bank from political concerns and afford it independence.  Nonetheless, 
there is also a consensus among respondents that structure matters. This latter view is 
consistent with empirical research that has found, in cross sections of countries, that 
institutional structure is associated with economic performance, perhaps because it indicates 
the ability of an institution to “tie its hands” and commit to a policy that may cause short-
term pain in the pursuit of longer-run gain.
2  There is less evidence, however, on whether and 
how the credibility of a particular central bank evolves over time in response to the conduct 
of policy. 
  The questions of the achievement and the maintenance of credibility are especially 
relevant for a new central bank.  An analysis of the experience of the European Central Bank 
                                                 
1 Seminal contributions on the role of credibility includes Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978) and Barro 
and Gordon (1983). 
2 For example, Cukierman (1992) analyzes the charters of central banks and shows, in a cross-country panel, 
that average inflation is lower in countries in which laws afford central banks greater independence.  Alesina 
and Summers (1993) also find cross-country evidence that the level of inflation, as well as its variability, is 
negatively associated with indicators of central bank independence, but there is no association between central 
bank independence and real variables. Questions have been raised, however, about whether the de jure structure 
is closely linked to the de facto behavior of institutions (Forder 1999).  
 Establishing Credibility, Goldberg and Klein 
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(ECB) during its early years of operation provides a natural experiment for considering this 
question. The architects of the institutional structure of the ECB were mindful of lessons 
from economic theory concerning the importance of independence from political 
considerations.
3  The role of conduct was also clearly apparent.  As indicated by the survey 
results in Blinder (2000), the directors of central banks are vitally aware that their policies are 
closely scrutinized for indications of general tendencies.  This may be especially true with a 
new central bank where each policy choice can lead to a larger updating of market priors than 
would be the case for a long-established central bank.  
This paper starts with the insight that asset prices contain information about the likely 
future course of inflation, and brings this insight to high frequency data in order to isolate the 
change in market perceptions of a central bank policy stance. As argued by Bernanke (2004), 
“successful monetary policies should stabilize, or “anchor”, inflation expectations so as to 
prevent them from becoming a source of instability in their own right”. Therefore, with asset 
prices as a starting point, in Section II, we present a framework for a novel test of the 
evolution of market perceptions of central bank policy. This test uses high frequency asset 
price data and the surprise components of economic data releases to estimate whether the 
market perception of the anti-inflation credibility of a central bank changes over time.
4 The 
key insight from this model is that a given surprise increase in inflationary pressures will 
result in a greater increase in a long interest rate relative to a short interest rate, and a larger 
exchange rate depreciation, when a central bank is perceived as having a weaker anti-
inflationary policy stance. If unvarying institutional structure is the dominant determinant of 
a new central bank’s credibility, then one would not expect to find a change in the high 
                                                 
3 Despite these lessons, some politicians continued to try to influence policy direction. For example, Oscar 
Lafontaine, appointed Finance Minister of Germany in the Autumn of 1998, called for the new ECB to lower 
interest rates from the time of his appointment until his resignation in March 1999. In response, Wim 
Duisenberg, the first president of the ECB, stated in November 1998 that it was a “normal phenomenon” for 
politicians to offer their views on the conduct of monetary policy, but “it would be very abnormal if those 
suggestions were to be listened to.” See “Wim Duisenberg, Banker to a New Europe,” The Economist, 
November 26, 1998. 
4 Forward market information has been used in other tests of policy regime credibility.  For example, Svensson 
(1991) shows that forward exchange rates were not within the target zone band of the European Monetary 
System (EMS) in the 1980s, a result he interprets as indicating that the EMS generally did not offer credible 
bands on its members’ currencies.  Svensson (1993) presents a similar set of tests to determine whether the 
inflation targets of Canada, New Zealand and Sweden were consistent with market yields.  These tests, while 
informative, require the presence of an explicit target, like an exchange rate band or an inflation target, to judge 
credibility.  Other related empirical analyses on the policy credibility of an exchange rate target zone use 
intervention data to estimate perceived target zone bands (Klein and Lewis 1993 and Lewis 1995). Establishing Credibility, Goldberg and Klein 
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frequency relationship between economic news and the slope of the yield curve over time.  
But if credibility for a new central bank is earned through the conduct of its policy, one 
would find a significant break in the relationship between news and the yield curve as 
credibility evolves.
 5 
  In Section III we apply this test to study the evolution of the credibility of the 
European Central Bank from the time it began its operations in January 1999 through mid-
2005.  Using data on the term structure of European bonds, we find evidence that the 
market’s perception of the anti-inflation credibility of the ECB has evolved over time and 
responded to ECB policy actions. As a benchmark for our analysis, and also to identify 
whether the results we found for the ECB could be attributed to changes in the economic 
environment rather than in specific views of its credibility, we also test for changes in the 
market’s perception of the anti-inflation policy of the Federal Reserve over the same sample 
period.  In contrast to our results for the ECB, we find no evidence of changing perceptions 
of the policy of the Federal Reserve, a result that is not surprising given the Fed’s long-
standing commitment to price stability under the chairmanship of both Alan Greenspan and 
Paul Volker. 
   
2. Central Bank Policy and Market Responses to News 
  In this section we present a model that shows how changes in perceptions about a 
policy stance can alter the response of asset prices to news. We begin with the standard 
framework used in empirical works that study the effect of news on asset prices, as in, for 
example, Anderson, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003). We then introduce a policy 
reaction function, and show how an evolving view of central bank credibility affects the 
relationship between news and asset prices.  We then discuss the empirical implementation of 
this model to the yield curve, so that we can use high frequency data to isolate the effects of 
news on short and longer term inflation expectations under different market perceptions of 
central bank policy. 
 
                                                 
5 Klein, Mizrach and Murphy (1991) develop a similar type of analysis concerning differences in the 
responsiveness of asset prices to news as policy evolves in their study of the changing responsiveness of dollar 
exchange rates to news about the United States current account.  They find the 1985 Plaza Accord altered 
perceptions of the degree to which American policy was concerned with the U.S. current account deficit. Establishing Credibility, Goldberg and Klein 
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2.1  Empirical Specification 
  The standard linear specification linking the surprise component of news to the 
change in an asset price is 
(1)      ( ) + + − + − + + − + = −
t t t t t t x E x q q ε β α  
where 
tt qq +− −  is the change in an asset price over the short period of time between t
-, just 
before an announcement, and t
+, just after that announcement.  + t x  represents the announced 
value of a variable, which is known at time t
+,  + − t t x E  represents the expected value of that 
variable before the announcement, so that  + − + −
t t t x E x  is the surprise component of the 
announcement, and εt+ is a white-noise error term.
6  As emphasized in Anderson et al. (2003) 
this parsimonious specification is most appropriate when the time horizon between t
- and t
+ is 
short, for example, when it is measured in minutes rather than days, and when news about the 
variable x does not become available at the same time (that is, within the span t
- to t
+ ) as 
announcements about some other relevant variable.  The actual set of variables that constitute 
x  depends upon the asset studied but, in general, any variable that markets construe as 
revealing information about current and future economic activity may be appropriate for 
study.  
  A more general version of equation (1), as a first step, takes into account market 
expectations about the policy response to news. As a second step, below, we also broaden the 
interpretation of qt so that it measures the slope of the yield curve.  First, consider the path, 
from time t forward, of a policy Mt, which has an effect on qt.  We can augment (1) to include 
the effect on 
tt qq +− −  of the change in the perception, between time t
- and t
+, of the path of 
policy.  This specification,     
(2)     ( ) ( ) + − − + + + − + − + + − + − + = −
t t t t t t t t t t M E M E x E x q q ε φ β α , 
captures the possibility that 
tt qq +− −  responds to economic news directly and indirectly due 
to the effect of the news on the expected course of policy, where the perceived policy path 
before the announcement occurs is  − − t t M E  and its perceived path after the announcement is 
                                                 
6 In the empirical estimation, we allow for the possibility that the error term is heteroskedastic. Establishing Credibility, Goldberg and Klein 
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+ + t t M E . The parameter φ  may be positive or negative, depending upon the policy and the 
asset.  Over a short window of time, the only reasonable source of a change in the perceived 
path of the policy over the short time span t
- to t
+ is the surprise component of the data 
announcement during this window.  This link arises because of a perception of the existence 
of a policy reaction function, such as  
(3)     ) ( i t i t t x x V M − − = λ  
where V represents other variables that affect the choice of M and the subscript i on the 
coefficient λ allows for the possibility of a different levels of responsiveness of the central 
bank to the value of x at different times in the sample period.  Likewise, this formulation 
allows for more than one target level of the variable,  i x , during the sample period. 
  To make the discussion of the policy reaction function more concrete, consider the 
case where (3) represents a Taylor Rule.  In this case, M represents monetary policy (such 
that an increase in M represents a more expansionary monetary policy), x is can be inflation 
data, and V represents an indicator of other economic conditions, for example the output gap 
or unemployment.  A higher value of λ represents a stronger anti-inflationary policy of the 
central bank. 
  In the presence of the perceived policy reaction function, the surprise component of 
the change in policy, ( ) + − + + −
t t t t M E M E , is defined by 
(4) () () ( ) () tt i i ii tt tt t t t t t t t E ME M E V E V xE x E x E x λλ ++ −+ + − + − + + − −= − − − +−  
Within our example, this expression shows that expected policy can depart from its prior path 
due to a change in the output gap, due the surprise component of an inflation data release, or 
due to a change in the target value of inflation.  
  In the short window surrounding a release of inflation numbers, typically   
) ( + − + −
t t t x E x  is not equal to zero.  In the absence of a simultaneous announcement of a 
change in target inflation, or of news on real economic variables such as the output gap, the 
other two right hand side terms of equation (4) can be set equal to zero.
7 
8  Within this 
                                                 
7 We have  0 ) ( = − − + t t t t V E V E  if x and V are uncorrelated, but, even if this is not the case, the qualitative effects 
discussed below are not affected if x and V are negatively correlated. If x and V are positively correlated, we 
would expect the sign on λ to be positive in the policy reaction function. Establishing Credibility, Goldberg and Klein 
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equation, the parameter  i λ  may change over time, and, indeed, testing for time variation in 
i λ  is the central empirical task in this paper.   
  Consider the response of bond prices to economic announcements.  Bond returns and 
inflation expectations are linked through the Fisher relationship. If we consider a short dated 
bond, for example a 2 year, and a long dated bond such as a 10 year, the Fisher relationship 
shows that 
10 10
10 tt t iE r π =+  and 
22
2 tt t iE r π = + , where the long and short real interest rates are 
10
t r  and 
2
t r , respectively.  With news affects on equilibrium real interest rates common to 
returns at all horizons along the yield curve, when we difference across the returns of long 
and short-dated bonds we abstract from the effect of news on equilibrium real returns.  We 
also are abstracting from the effect of news on term premia or  liquidity premia, a very 
reasonable approach over the short time horizon between times t
- and t
+. The regressand 
tt qq +− −  is the expected change in the differential in the long horizon and short horizon 
inflation rates due to the news announcement since     
(5)     ) ( ) (
2 10 2 10
− − − − + + + + − + − − − = −
t t t t t t t t t t E E E E q q π π π π  
where  10 π  is the average expected inflation rate over 10 years and  2 π  is the average 
expected inflation rate over 2 years.
9   
  Substituting (4) into (2), and interpreting 
tt qq + − − as the slope of the yield curve, we 
get  
                                                                                                                                                 
8 We would not expect, in a sample with many observations, many instances where  ) ( i t i t i x E x E − + − λ  does not 
equal zero since a nonzero value for this term would mean that the news announcement itself alters the view of 
the target value  i x  in the short time interval t
- to t
+. Even if, say, an unusually large value of the surprise 
component of the news alters market participants’ perceptions of the target value in one or two instances in a 
sample with many observations, this would leave  0 ) ( = − − + i t i t i x E x E λ  for the vast majority of cases.   
9  Fleming and Remolona (1999) also argue that the effects of news on asset prices of different maturities 
reveals information about market participant beliefs about central bank reaction functions. Research by Estrella, 
Rodriguez and Schich (2002) focuses on the relationship between the slope of the yield curve and subsequent 
real activity and inflation.  Using monthly data from 1967 to December 1998, the German yield curves were 
found to be most informative at inflation prediction horizons beyond two years, while the US term structure was 
most informative at somewhat shorter horizons. Such analyses, building on Estrella and Mishkin (1997), also 
argue that inversions in the slope of the yield curve have been successful as recession predictors. The measured 
strength of these relationships are not stable over time, and vary with the maturity horizons of the bonds 
examined. Early research by Huizinga and Mishkin (1986) applied to monthly data for the United States 
recognizes the sensitivity of the slope of the yield curve to perceptions of monetary policy regimes in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  These studies do not examine the effects of news announcements on the slope of the yield curve, or 
use high frequency data as in our study. Establishing Credibility, Goldberg and Klein 
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(6)   () ( ) + + − + − + + − − + = −
t t t t i t t x E x q q ε φλ β α . 
This equation suggests that, in the presence of changing perceptions about the central bank’s 
policy, the estimated coefficient on inflation news,  ) ( i φλ β − , is unstable.
10   
  We can be more precise about the instability of  ) ( i φλ β −  by considering the simple 
case where a policy action undertaken by the central bank, such as a major tightening, 
changes the views of market participants. Suppose that before this action, market participants 
thought that the central bank policy was dovish (D), meaning one of accommodating 
inflation while after the action there was the view that the central bank would be more 
aggressive or hawkish (H) in combating inflation.  These policies are distinguished by the 
condition that  H D λ λ > .  We would expect to find a larger value for the estimated coefficient 
in the earlier period as compared to the later period since ( ) ( ) D H β φλ β φλ − >− .  In contrast, 
suppose perceptions of policy were unvarying, perhaps because these perceptions were 
driven by the initial and unvarying institutional structure. We would not expect to find a 
significantly different estimated coefficient on the response of the slope of a central bank’s 
yield curve to price news across the sample period studied, reflecting stability over time in 
the anchoring of inflation expectations. 
  This example, pointing to a discrete change in perceptions of λ, offers a particularly 
stark view of expectations formation since one episode alters market expectations.  An 
evolving view of central bank policy, one reflecting a gradual learning process, may be more 
consistent with reality.  In either case, a more complete depiction of this model would specify 
the way in which the market’s view of the stance of the central bank evolves over time in 
response to policy.  The main econometric technique we use for identifying the changes over 
time in the slope of the yield curve does not require us to specify this learning process nor the 
associated evolution of  ) ( i φλ β − . As we develop in section 3.2, our application of new 
econometric techniques by Elliott and Müller (2005) allows for tests for general parameter 
instability, and estimation of the smoothed parameter path under very general assumptions.  
  
                                                 
10 If news alters the perception of the target level of x, we could find evidence of a time-varying intercept as 
well since, in that case, we would have  ( )( ) + + − + − + − + + − − + − + = −
t t t t i i t i t i t t x E x x E x E q q ε φλ β φλ α )) ( ( . Establishing Credibility, Goldberg and Klein 
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3. Evolving Perceptions of European Central Bank Policy 
In this section we present the data, methodology, and results of our tests for changes 
in the market’s perception of the anti-inflation stance of the European Central Bank during its 
first six-and-one-half years of operation, from January 1999 through June 2005.  We begin, 
in Section 3.1, with a description of the data we use for these tests.  Five different dependent 
variables are examined: the change in the term spread (alternatively called the change in the 
slope of the yield curve) for German, French and Italian government bonds, the change in the 
Euro/dollar exchange rate, and the change in the term spread of United States government 
bonds. The tests for possible parameter instability of the United States term spread is offered 
as a benchmark; were we to find evidence of parameter instability for regressions based on 
this series, we would be concerned that evidence of parameter instability using European 
bond or exchange rate series may not, in fact, reflect an evolving perception of ECB 
credibility but, rather, some structural change common to financial markets across all four of 
these industrial countries.  However, as shown in Section 3.3, we find no evidence of 
parameter instability for the regressions using the United States term spread series while we 
do find significant evidence of a change in the term spread for the tests using the other four 
series using the Elliott – Müller test. In Section 3.4 we present estimates of the time path of 
) ( i φλ β −  using the Müller – Petalas procedure, and link these time paths to actual policy 
changes undertaken by the ECB.  Finally, in Section 3.5, we present sup-Wald tests for a 
discrete break in the regression relationship and the dates associated with those breaks. 
 
3.1 Data 
  The two types of data used in our analysis are inflation announcements and related 
market expectations, and various asset prices, where the assets are government bonds and 
foreign exchange.  We begin this section with a description of our construction of inflation 
surprises.  We then discuss the five different asset prices used as dependent variables in our 
estimation. 
 
  Inflation Announcements and Expectations: The news variable we use is the 
difference between the monthly announcement of the Core Consumer Price Index for the 
United States and the expected value of this announcement prior to its release, as measured Establishing Credibility, Goldberg and Klein 
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by survey responses.  The closely watched core CPI is the best inflation measure for this 
analysis, as evidenced by the impact of related news on markets,
11 the theoretical literature 
on prices and monetary policy, and Humphrey Hawkins testimony by Alan Greenspan in 
recent years, where the CPI excluding food and energy is typically the only measure of price 
inflation discussed. 
12 
Although our primary emphasis is on evolving credibility of the ECB, and we will 
introduce European bonds for constructing yield curves, the analysis relies on U.S. inflation 
data, not European inflation series. This is a deliberate choice, motivated by extensive 
evidence on the news content of United States price announcements as contrasted with 
comparable announcements of prices for Germany, Italy, France, or Europe as a whole. 
Recent studies, for example by Andersen et al (2003), Goldberg and Leonard (2003), Faust, 
Rogers, and Wright (2004), Chinn and Frankel (2004) and Ehrmann and Fratscher (2004), 
support United States macroeconomic news affecting both United States and European asset 
prices, with little or no significant effect of European macroeconomic news on asset prices in 
either Europe or America.
13 Market participants argue that the true news content of some 
German and other European price announcements are questionable because of issues of data 
quality and episodes of data leaks prior to official announcement times.
14 
 The  news or surprise component of an economic data release represents the difference 
between the actual release and the markets’ expectation of the contents of the release.  The 
expectations data we use are median responses from weekly surveys of market participants 
conducted by Money Market Services, a division of Standard & Poor’s, and more recently 
from Action Economics.
15 A regression of the 75 median monthly survey responses on the 
actual monthly inflation reports generates a coefficient of 0.68, with p-value of 0.026, with 
the regression unable to reject unbiasedness of the survey as a predictor of the actual value of 
                                                 
11 See Anderson et al (2003), Goldberg and Leonard (2003), Faust, Rogers and Wright (2004) and Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher (2004). 
12 For a nice overview of the evidence and related literature, see Clark (2001). 
13 Gadzinski and Orlandi (2004) argue that inflation persistence is comparable across the United States and the 
euro area. 
14 As robustness checks, we also examine the implications of alternative U.S. price news, and of a range of 
measures of European price news.  Our results are robust to other measures, but these other measures 
sometimes have small and volatile effects on bond yields or the slope of the yield curve. 
15 Money Market Services were the source of these data through December 2003.  Haver Analytics provided 
continuous expectations and announcement data through 2004 using data from Action Economics. Gurkaynek 
and Wolfers (2005) show that these data have been among the best performing expectations series for important 
macroeconomic variables over the sample period that we analyze. Establishing Credibility, Goldberg and Klein 
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the inflation reports.  In creating news variable, we normalize news by the sample standard 
deviation of the difference between the reported and the expected values of the 
announcements so that the variable news has mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
 
  Asset Price Data:  Five different dependent variables will be used in the regressions.  
In each case, the dependent variable, 
tt qq + − − , represents the change in q between 30 minutes 
before and 30 minutes after the monthly inflation announcement. Four of the dependent 
variables are the change in the term spread between 10-year and 2-year interest rates, 
qt=
2 10
t t r r − , for French, Italian, German, or United States government bonds.  By the Fisher 
relationship and equation (5) the regressand 
tt qq + − −  is the expected change in the 
differential in the 10-year and 2-year inflation rates due to the inflation news.
16  Thus, when 
using these four bond series,  ) ( i φλ β −  can be interpreted as a function of the direct effect 
(represented by β ) and the indirect effect (via a policy response, as represented by  i φλ ) of 
current inflation news on the expected long-run relative to short-run inflation rates. 
  There is a similar interpretation of  ) ( i φλ β −  in the regressions that use the fifth 
dependent variable, where 
tt qq +− −  represents the change in the logarithm of the euro per 
U.S. dollar exchange rate, thirty minutes before and thirty minutes after the news 
announcement. With this regressand, and applying purchasing power parity concepts, an 
                                                 








t t t i E r + = π , where the ten-year and two-year 
real interest rates are 
10
t i  and 
2
t i , respectively.  News effects on equilibrium real interest rates are common to 
returns at all horizons along the yield curve. As a consequence, when we difference across the returns of long 
and short-dated bonds we abstract from the effect of news on equilibrium real returns.  We also are abstracting 
from the effect of news on term premia or liquidity premia, which seems reasonable given the short time 
horizon between times t
- and t
+.  In a similar vein, Fleming and Remolona (1999) argue that the effects of news 
on asset prices of different maturities reveals information about market participant beliefs about central bank 
reaction functions. Research by Estrella, Rodriguez and Schich (2002) focuses on the relationship between the 
slope of the yield curve and subsequent real activity and inflation.  The German application was over monthly 
data from 1967 to December 1998. In inflation prediction, the German yield curves were found to be most 
informative at prediction horizons beyond two years, while the US term structure was most informative at 
somewhat shorter horizons. Such analyses, building on Estrella and Mishkin (1997), also argue that inversions 
in the slope of the yield curve have been successful as recession predictors. The measured strength of these 
relationships are not stable over time, and vary with the maturity horizons of the bonds examined. Early 
research by Huizinga and Mishkin (1986) applied to monthly data for the United States recognizes the 
sensitivity of the slope of the yield curve to perceptions of monetary policy regimes in the 1970s and 1980s.  
These studies do not examine the effects of news announcements on the slope of the yield curve, or use high 
frequency data as in our study. Establishing Credibility, Goldberg and Klein 
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increase in 
tt qq +− −  due to United States core CPI news indicates an increase in the expected 
inflation rate in Europe relative to the expected inflation rate in the United States (Klein, 
Mizrach and Murphy 1991).  In this case,   ) ( i φλ β −  decreases across time if, during that 
period, market participants view a strengthening of the anti-inflation policy stance of the 
ECB, a weakening of the anti-inflation stance of the Fed, or some combination of the two 
such that there is the anti-inflation stance of the ECB becomes more hawkish, relative to its 
prior history and relative to the policy of the U.S. Federal Reserve.  
 
3.2 Econometric Methods 
  New tests developed by Elliott and Müller (2005) allow one to test for the presence of 
persistent time variation in one or more regression coefficients over the sample period 
without specifying the exact breaking process, such as breaks that occur in a random fashion, 
serial correlation in the changes of coefficients, or a clustering of break points.
17  This feature 
of their test makes it well suited for our purposes since we do not need to test for a particular 
type of learning by market participants about central bank policy.  The Elliott and Müller 
(2005) “quasi-Local Level” (qLL) statistic takes a negative value, and a value smaller (more 
negative) than the critical value implies a failure to reject time variation in one or more 
coefficients for the entire sample period.  This procedure tests for time variation over the 
entire sample and, as such, does not identify a particular date as the one most likely to 
represent a discrete break point.   
  While an unspecified evolution of  ) ( i φλ β −  may be more consistent with our notions 
of learning about the policy stance of a new central bank, the identification of a break date 
would be useful for our purposes (if, in fact, this is how perceptions changed) because our 
tests do not allow us to distinguish between  time variation in  ) ( φλ β −  due to variation over 
time in λ  rather than, say, variation over time in β , the direct responsiveness of the change 
in asset prices to the surprise component of news.  In the wake of the creation of a new 
central bank, such as the creation of the ECB in January 1999, it is reasonable to expect that 
                                                 
17 Elliott and Müller write that, for their tests, “…the precise form of the breaking process [of the coefficients] is 
irrelevant for the asymptotic power of the tests.” (p.10)  An implication of this is that “From a practical 
perspective… the researcher does not have to specify the exact path of the breaking process in order to be able 
to carry out (almost) efficient inference.” (p. 4) 
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the most likely cause of a time variation in  ) ( φλ β −  is changes in λ  rather than changes in 
β  or φ .  One way we can attempt to identify the source of changes in  ) ( φλ β −  is to 
estimate its path over time and consider how its movements correlate to actual changes in 
ECB policy. We do this using the method developed by Müller and Petalas (2005) to 
estimate the smoothed time path of a time-varying parameter.  
  We also test for the robustness of both the finding of parameter instability and the 
timing of changes in  ) ( i φλ β −  by presenting sup-Wald tests for parameter stability (see 
Andrews 1993 and Bai 1997).  These tests are predicated on the existence of one or more 
discrete break points.  They are conducted by running 0.7×T  regressions, where T is the 
number of observations in the data set, that take the form  
 (6)   ( ) ( ) + + − + + − + − + + − + − + = −
t t t t I I t t t t t x E x D x E x q q ε β β α  
where  I D  is a dummy variable that equals 0 for the first n observations of the sample and 
equals 1 for the remaining T – n observations.
18  This generates a set of 0.7×T  I β ’s and 
0.7×T  associated test statistics.  The sup-Wald test compares the largest F-value for all of the 
I β ’s with critical values presented in Andrews (1993) and, if this sup-Wald statistic exceeds 
the critical value, the date associated with that  I β  is the statistically significant estimated 
break date.  Bai (1997) shows how to test for multiple break dates using a similar 
methodology. 
  
3.3   Time Variation in the Effects of News on The Slope of the Yield Curve    
In this section we report the results of the Elliott and Müller (2005) qLL statistic for 
the five asset price series discussed above.  These statistics are negative, and a smaller (i.e. 
more negative) value of the statistic allows one to reject the null hypothesis of a lack of 
persistent time variation in the effect of news on inflation expectations.  Thus, suppose there 
was an evolving view of the policy stance of the ECB over time, but not of the Fed over this 
same period. We would expect to see a smaller qLL statistic than some critical value for 
regressions using the change in the term spread for German, French and Italian government 
                                                 
18 The sup-Wald tests require trimming, that is, fewer than T  regressions are run for a sample with T 
observations.  Andrews (1993) suggests the use of symmetric 15% trimming and therefore, in this case, the test 
would involve 0.7×T regressions.  There is no comparable trimming in the Elliott and Müller test. Establishing Credibility, Goldberg and Klein 
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bonds before and after the inflation announcements, as well as for the change in the euro / 
dollar exchange rate before and after the inflation announcements, but a qLL statistic larger 
than this critical value for a regression in which the dependent variable is the change in the 
term spread on United States government bonds before and after the news announcements. 
Results of this test are presented in Table 1.
19  The first row is a test of the general 
persistent variation in the slope coefficient only.  The second row is a joint test of the general 
persistent variation in both the slope and the intercept coefficients.  Critical values are 
included in the bottom row of the table.  Entries in bold and italic represent a qLL statistic 
that is significant at better than the 99 percent level of confidence, bold entries represent a 
qLL statistic that is significant at between the 95 percent and 99 percent levels of confidence, 
and italic entries represent a qLL statistic that is significant at between the 90 percent and 95 
percent levels of confidence. 
 
Table 1: Elliott-Müller Test for Persistent Time Variation 
Change in Term Spread of Government Bonds of  Test of Time 
Variation of  Germany France  Italy  United  States 
Change in 
Euro/$ 
Slope  -10.95 -8.81  -7.43  -5.40  -8.79 
Slope & 
Intercept 
-21.52  -9.08 -7.11 -8.93  -16.69 
No. of obs.  74  74  72  67  75 
Critical Values: 1 coefficient (Slope alone) 1% -11.05; 5% -8.36; 10% -7.14  
                            2 coefficients (Slope & Intercept) 1% -17.57; 5% -14.32; 10% -12.80 
 
 The results in Table 1 show that there is evidence of persistent time variation in 
) ( φλ β −  in regressions of inflation news on the change in the term spread of German 
government bonds and French government bonds, and in the Euro / dollar exchange rate, at 
greater than the 95 percent level of confidence, and on the change in the term spread of 
Italian bonds at between the 90 percent and the 95 percent level of confidence.  In contrast, 
there is no significant evidence of persistent time variation in the slope coefficient in a 
regression of news on the change in the term spread of United States government bonds over 
this same period of time.   
                                                 
19 As suggested by Elliott and Müller (2005), we allow for the possibility of heteroskedasticity in the variance-
covariance matrix of the score series  { } + ×
t t news ε  by using the Newey-West (1987) correction. Establishing Credibility, Goldberg and Klein 
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All of these results are consistent with the model presented above in which  ) ( i φλ β −  
varies as  i λ  changes with an evolving view of the anti-inflation credibility of the European 
Central Bank in the period after its inception.   There is not a corresponding evolution in the 
view of the inflation preferences of the Federal Reserve during this period, which followed 
almost fifteen years of observations of the policy actions of the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors under the leadership of Chairman Greenspan. 
The second row of qLL statistics in Table 1 present results of a test of the joint 
persistent time variation of the slope and intercept terms of a regression that takes the form of 
specification (6) (footnote 11 presents a discussion of the possibility of persistent time 
variation in the intercept as well as the slope).  There is even stronger evidence of persistent 
time variation in this joint test for the change in the term spread for German bonds and the 
change in the euro / dollar exchange rate, but weaker evidence for persistent time variation 
when the dependent variable is the change in the term spread of either French or Italian 
government bonds.  But again, the benchmark regression, of the change in the term spread of 
United States government bonds, fails to offer evidence of persistent time variation in the 
coefficients of the regression. 
The evidence in this table is suggestive of an evolving perception of the policy stance 
of the European Central Bank.  This conclusion is bolstered by the estimated time path of 
) ( i φλ β −  presented in the next section. 
 
3.4 Estimated Paths of  ) ( i φλ β −  
In this section we present the estimated parameter paths of  ) ( i φλ β − , using the 
technique developed by Müller and Petalas (2005).  They show how to estimate the 
parameter path for general unstable time series models by minimizing a weighted average 
risk criterion, a procedure that is akin to a smoothing problem.  This procedure requires only 
general assumptions about the true persistent time variation of the coefficients.
20 
                                                 
20 Müller and Petalas (2005) describe their procedure as an extension of the Kalman smoothing formulae with 
the optimal smoother for the true path of the time varying coefficient a function of the score sequence   
{ } + ×
t t news ε .  See their paper for details, and for an outline of how to implement their procedure. Establishing Credibility, Goldberg and Klein 
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Figures 1 presents the estimated parameter paths of   ) ( i φλ β −  for the regressions 
using the four bond term spreads.  Figure 2 presents the parameter path for the slope 
coefficient in the regression on the euro / dollar exchange rate and, to provide comparability 
to the first figure, the slope coefficients for the German and United States term spreads that 
are presented in Figure 1.   
The first thing to note from Figures 1 and 2 is that the estimated value of  ) ( i φλ β −  
for each of the term spreads for the three European government bonds, as well as the 
euro/dollar exchange rate, is greater than the estimated value of  ) ( i φλ β −  for the term spread 
of the United States bond.  This is consistent with the view that, at the outset of the operation 
of the European Central Bank, the market perceived it as having a weaker anti-inflation 
stance than the Federal Reserve.  Another immediately apparent characteristic of the four 
time paths in Figure 1, and the time path of the euro/dollar exchange rate in Figure 2, is the 
relative variability of the three European ) ( i φλ β − ’s as compared to that of the United States.  
The standard deviations of the estimated  ) ( i φλ β − ’s are 0.0043 for Italy, 0.0047 for France, 
0.0057 for Germany, and 0.0203 for the euro/dollar exchange rate, but only 0.0036 for the 
United States, all of which are consistent with the results of the Elliott – Müller qLL statistics 
presented in Table 1. 
The time variation of the estimated paths of  ) ( i φλ β −  in light of the actions 
undertaken by the European Central Bank bolster our contention that the variation in this 
parameter is due to changing views of its policy stance (as reflected in  i λ ) rather than, say, 
changing values in β .   
 Establishing Credibility, Goldberg and Klein 
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  The peak values of  ) ( i φλ β −  occur at the time of the May 1999 core CPI 
announcement for the French and Italian bond yields, at the time of the June 1999 
announcement for the German bond yields, and at the time of the April 2000 announcement 
for the euro / dollar rate. The decline in  ) ( i φλ β −  continued for the regressions using the 
three European bond yields until the late autumn of 2001, and for the euro/dollar rate for the 
remainder of the sample period.  During much of two-year period beginning in the autumn of 
1999, the ECB was tightening monetary policy.  November 4, 1999 marked the first time that 
the ECB raised its key interest rate since it began operations on January 1, 1999.
21 At that 
time, this interest rate, the rate for main refinancing operations, was raised from 2.5 percent 
to 3.0 percent.  This was followed by another 25 basis point increase on February 3, 2000, 
additional 25 basis point increases on March 16 and April 27, and a 50 point basis point 
increase to 4.25 percent on June 9, 2000.   
The smoothed estimate of  ) ( i φλ β −  for the three European term spreads began to rise 
again towards the end of 2001, up until September 2002 (for the German term spread), 
January 2003 (for the Italian term spread) and June 2003 (for the French term spread).  This 
is consistent with a change in the actions of the European Central Bank towards a more 
accommodative monetary policy.  This policy move occurred on May 11, 2001 when the 
ECB lowered the minimum bid rate for the main refinancing operations by 25 basis points, to 
4.50 percent.
22  Three additional interest rate cuts by the ECB occurred on August 30, 2001 
(when the interest rate was cut by 25 basis points), on September 17, 2001 (when the interest 
rate was cut by 50 basis points), and on November 8, 2001 (when the interest rate was cut by 
50 basis points).
23   This policy stance continued with three more rate cuts, on December 5, 
2002 (a 50 basis point cut), March 6, 2003 (a 25 basis point cut) and June 6, 2003 (a 50 basis 
point cut).  Also, early in 2003 the ECB refined their “two pillar” approach, with the 
                                                 
21 The key interest rate on fixed rate tenders was at 3.00 percent from January 1, 1999 through April 9, when it 
dropped by 50 basis points to 2.50 percent. On November 4, 2000 a period of monetary tightening started. For 
main refinancing operations, changes in the rate are effective from the first operation following the date when 
changes were indicated. 
22 On June 8 2000 the ECB announced that, starting June 28, 2000, the main refinancing operations of the 
Eurosystem would switch from fixed rate tenders to variable rate tenders.  Thereafter the key interest rate set by 
the ECB was the minimum bid rate of the variable rate tenders for the main refinancing operations.  See 
www.ecb.int/stats/monetary/rates.  
23 One may be concerned that, because this period includes September 11, 2001, the effect of the terrorist 
attacks on that day may be responsible for the shift. However, in this figure we do not observe comparable 
changes in the value of  ) ( i φλ β −  for regressions using the U.S. term spread.  Establishing Credibility, Goldberg and Klein 
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importance of M3 apparently reduced and the target for inflation at or slightly below two 
percent.  The main refinancing interest rate remained at 2.00 percent from June 2003 until the 
end of the sample period in June 2005.  
  In contrast to the increase in the smoothed estimated path of  ) ( i φλ β −  for the three 
European government term spreads beginning in the late autumn of 2001, the estimated path 
of ) ( i φλ β −  for the euro / dollar exchange rate continued to decrease through this period, 
and, indeed, through the rest of the sample period ending in June 2005.  Of course, the 
behavior of the Euro / dollar exchange rate depends upon the actions of the Fed as well as 
that of the ECB and the estimated value of  ) ( i φλ β −  for the regression using the United 
States term spread increased along with the coefficients for the European term spreads 
throughout 2003; so, for this period, at least, the smoothed estimated values of  ) ( i φλ β − ’s 
from the bond regressions reflect a somewhat parallel evolution of perceptions for the Fed 
and the ECB.  
 
3.5  Sup-Wald Statistics 
  Finally, to gauge the robustness of the Elliott – Müller qLL tests, and of the smoothed 
paths of the  ) ( i φλ β −  coefficient obtained through the Müller-Petalas method, this section 
presents sup-Wald tests for a discrete change in  ) ( i φλ β − , based on Andrews (1993) and Bai 
(1997). As discussed above, these sup-Wald tests are based on a more restricted assumption 
concerning the break point than the qLL test but, since a break point is estimated rather than 
the overall stability of the parameter, the sup-Wald tests also provide a date for the break.  
We compare these dates to the smoothed parameter paths presented in Section 3.4. 
  Table 2 presents the sup-Wald statistics based on sets of five different regressions that 
take the form of (6), four regressions in which the dependent variable is the change in one of 
the term spreads, and one regression in which the dependent variable is the change in the 
Euro / dollar exchange rate.  The statistics presented in the top section of this table show 
evidence of a significant break, at better than the 95 percent level of confidence, for the 
regressions using the change in the term spread for German and Italian government bonds, 
and for the Euro / dollar exchange rate.  There is no evidence of a significant discrete break 
for the regression using the change in the term spread of French or United States government Establishing Credibility, Goldberg and Klein 
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bonds.  In addition, using the technique presented by Bai (1997) to search for multiple break 
points, there is evidence of a second break point for the change in the Euro / dollar exchange 
rate. 
 
Table 2: sup-Wald Test for Discrete Break Point 
Change in Term Spread of Government Bonds of   










    June 15,  
2001 
   February 21, 
2001 
No. of obs.  74  74  72  67  75 
Critical Values (from Andrews 1993) 1% 12.35; 5% 8.85; 10% 7.17 
Tests conducted with 15 percent symmetric trimming.                             
 
  It is interesting to compare the dates obtained through the sup-Wald tests with the 
smoothed parameter paths obtained using the Müller and Petalas method.  The dates 
presented in Table 2 for the significant estimated break points for the term spread 
regressions, November 16, 2000 for the German case and the June 15, 2001 for the Italian 
case, occur about mid-way between the peak and the trough of the respective time paths of 
) ( i φλ β −  in the period between mid-1999 and late-2001, the time when these coefficients 
had their largest average value.  There is also a consistency between the two estimated break 
points for the Euro / dollar regression and the Müller – Petalas estimated time paths since the 
first estimated break, February 21, 2001, comes at the time just before the smoothed 
parameter path descends from a high average value and the second estimated break, April 16, 
2003, occurs immediately prior to a large decrease in the value of the estimated smoothed 
parameter path.  Thus, there is an overall consistency between the sup-Wald results and the 
Müller – Petalas estimated smoothed time path, suggesting the robustness of these results. 
 
4. Conclusions 
  The importance of the reputation of a central bank for the success of its operations is 
stressed in theory and is evident from practical experience. An important question is whether 
a central bank gains credibility through its institutional structure or through the conduct of Establishing Credibility, Goldberg and Klein 
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policy. This question is especially relevant for a newly established central bank that faces the 
challenge of establishing its reputation, sometimes in the face of political controversy over 
the appropriate conduct of monetary policy.    
  The evolution of the markets’ perceptions of the policy stance of the European 
Central Bank since it began operations in January 1999 is interesting for a number of reasons.  
One of these reasons is the inherent interest of the economic experience of the eurozone.  A 
second reason is that the establishment of the European Central bank provides a natural 
experiment for considering how the reputation of a central bank evolves over time.  This 
episode is a particularly rich vein to mine because of the controversy surrounding the conduct 
of monetary policy in Europe as the ECB began its operations.  
  In this paper, we have proposed and executed a novel test for the study of the 
evolution of market perceptions about the policy stance of a central bank through the use of 
high-frequency data. This methodology and the use of high frequency data provides a unique 
window into the evolution of perceptions of monetary policy rules, an issue more typically 
and less precisely addressed using lower frequency data. We find evidence of an evolution of 
perceptions of the policy stance of the ECB, one linked to its interest rate policy.  There is 
not a similar shift in the market’s perception of the policy stance of the Federal Reserve, a 
period marked by the stability in its leadership, the consistency of its stated goals, and the 
broad support for its conduct of policy. 
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